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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/069,710	07/15/2002	Graeme Deaker	TJK/216	3993

27717 7590 06/15/2006

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EXAMINER

ABDI, KAMBIZ

ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
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3621

DATE MAILED: 06/15/2006

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Office Action Summary

Application No.

10/069,710

Applicant(s)

DEAKER ET AL.

Examiner

Kambiz Abdi

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-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE _____ MONTH(S) OR THIRTY (30) DAYS, WHICHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 03 March 2006.
- 2a) ☒ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☐ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

Disposition of Claims

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 1-4 and 6-40 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) _____ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 1-4 and 6-40 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) _____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on _____ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 12) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some * c) ☐ None of:
- ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
 - ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. _____.
 - ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

Attachment(s)

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of References Cited (PTO-892) | 4) <input type="checkbox"/> Interview Summary (PTO-413)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date. _____ |
| 2) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948) | 5) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152) |
| 3) <input type="checkbox"/> Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date _____ | 6) <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ |

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DETAILED ACTION

1. The prior office actions are incorporated herein by reference. In particular, the observations with respect to claim language, and response to previously presented arguments.

- Claims 1, 31, 32, 34, 35, and 40 are amended.
- Claim 5 is canceled.
- Claims 1-4 and 6-40 are pending.

Response to Arguments

2. Applicant's arguments filed March 3, 2006 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive for the following reasons:

3. In response to applicant argument regarding rejection of Claims 1-4 and 6-40 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being obvious over the prior art used in the rejection. The current examiner believes that the argument that the applicant has put forward on regards to claims are not persuasive to over come the prior art of record used in the rejection.

4. In response to applicant's argument that the references fail to show certain features of applicant's invention, it is noted that the features upon which applicant relies (i.e., "gif voucher", on-line, off-line, "stored value instrument", coupons, etc.) are not recited in the rejected claim(s). Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See *In re Van Geuns*, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Applicant has argued that the prior art of record does not show the specific of a gift voucher (gift certificate). However, none of the claims do recite such phrase as "gift voucher", as a matter of fact the claims specifically claim "goods/services voucher" (coupon), therefore, the rejection is proper and is sustained. As for the method of using such "goods/services voucher" (coupon) "via a plurality of pathways" does not relay the meaning the applicant has in mind, as in the ordinary meaning of the phrase in the art is clearly the electronic pathways such as

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different lines of communications it would be almost inherent and one skilled in the art would know that multiple paths are used for transfer of the information in an electronic network such as the internet.

5. As for the argument that applicant has put forward in regards to complexity of the prior art, it should be noted that the process of the prior art is functionally equivalent to what is claimed by the applicant.

6. The Examiner would like to thank the Applicant for taking the time to provide the Examiner with an *aide memoire* regarding the legal standard for obviousness rejections under 35 U.S.C. 103, and for providing a clarification for the Examiner's benefit. In retort, the Examiner offers this augmentation the Applicant's condensed summary vis-à-vis the obligatory triad of criteria needed to establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness.

7. Applicant argues that a *prima facie* case of obviousness has apparently not been established. In response, the Examiner respectfully submits that obviousness is determined on the basis of the evidence as a whole and the relative persuasiveness of the arguments. See *In re Oetiker*, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992); *In re Hedges*, 783 F.2d 1038, 1039, 228 USPQ 685,686 (Fed. Cir. 1992); *In re Piasecki*, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785,788 (Fed. Cir. 1984); and *In re Rinehart*, 531 F.2d 1048, 1052, 189 USPQ 143,147 (CCPA 1976). Using this standard, the Examiner respectfully submits that the burden of presenting a *prima facie* case of obviousness has successfully been satisfied, since evidence of corresponding claim elements in the prior art has been presented, and since the Examiner has expressly articulated the combinations and the motivations for combinations that fairly suggest Applicant's claimed invention. Note, for example, the motivations explicitly stated in the paragraphs below.

MOTIVATION TO COMBINE

8. In response to Applicant's argument that there is no suggestion to combine the references, the Examiner recognizes that obviousness can only be established by combining or modifying the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention where there is some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to do so found either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art. See *In re*

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Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988) and *In re Jones*, 958 F.2d 347, 21 USPQ2d 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1992).

9. Furthermore, the Examiner recognizes that references cannot be arbitrarily altered or modified and that there must be some reason why one skilled in the art would be motivated to make the proposed modifications. Although the motivation or suggestion to make modifications must be articulated, it is respectfully submitted that there is no requirement that the motivation to make modifications must be expressly articulated within the references themselves. References are evaluated by what they suggest to one versed in the art, rather than by their specific disclosures, *In re Bozek*, 163 USPQ 545 (CCPA 1969).

10. The Examiner is concerned that the Applicant apparently ignores the mandate of the numerous court decisions supporting the position given above. The issue of obviousness is not determined by what the references expressly state but by what they would reasonably suggest to one of ordinary skill in the art, as supported by decisions in *In re Delisle* 406 Fed 1326, 160 USPQ 806; *In re Kell, Terry and Davies* 208 USPQ 871; and *In re Fine*, 837 F.2d 1071, 1074, 5 USPQ 2d 1596, 1598 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing *In re Lalu*, 747 F.2d 703, 705, 223 USPQ 1257, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). Further, it was determined in *In re Lamberti et al* 192 USPQ 278 (CCPA) that:

- (i) obvious does not require absolute predictability;
- (ii) non-preferred embodiments of prior art must also be considered; and
- (iii) the question is not express teaching of references but what they would suggest.

11. According to *In re Jacoby*, 135 USPQ 317 (CCPA 1962), the skilled artisan is presumed to know something more about the art than only what is disclosed in the applied references. Within *In re Bode*, 193 USPQ 12 (CCPA 1977), every reference relies to some extent on knowledge of persons skilled in the art to complement that which is disclosed therein. In *In re Conrad* 169 USPQ 170 (CCPA), obviousness is not based on express suggestion, but what references taken collectively would suggest.

12. In the instant case, the Examiner respectfully notes that each and every motivation to combine the applied references is accompanied by select portions of the respective references, which specifically support that particular motivation. As such, it is NOT seen that the Examiner's combination of references

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is unsupported by the applied prior art of record. Rather, it is respectfully submitted that explanation based on the logic and scientific reasoning of one ordinarily skilled in the art at the time of the invention that support a holding of obviousness has been adequately provided by the motivations and reasons indicated by the Examiner, *Ex pane Levengood* 28 USPQ 2d 1300 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter., 4/22/93).

Reasonable Expectation of Success

13. Obviousness requires only a *reasonable* expectation of success (see MPEP 2143.02). This foundation puts forth the standard that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize a benefit or enhancement by combining the references. Obviousness does not require absolute predictability. It does not require that the benefit must be extraordinary, nor does it necessitate that profit is certain, or success guaranteed. The prior art can be modified or combined to reject claims as *prima facie* obvious as long as there is a reasonable expectation of success to those of customary proficiency. See *In re Merck & Co., Inc.*, 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986)

14. It is understood that at least some degree of predictability is required, and that the Applicant may present evidence showing that there was no reasonable expectation of success. See *In re Rinehart*, 531 F.2d 1048, 189 USPQ 143 (CCPA 1976). However, this standard should not be mistakenly interpreted as an open door to declare that the Examiner's rationale is lacking any support at all, or that the Examiner's rejections do not show success *beyond* a reasonable expectation. Indeed, the standard is one of sensible success, not guaranteed or exceptional success. Evidence showing there was no reasonable expectation of success may support a conclusion of nonobviousness. Such evidence to the contrary must be supplied in support of such an allegation against the Examiner's rejections. Evidence should be clear, analogous to the references and claimed invention, and should not require excessive skill in the art to comprehend.

15. In addition, a reasonable expectation of success does not require than an observer be thoroughly proficient with the art or industry, nor does it require that the success be particularly evident to one of less-than-ordinary skill in the art. MPEP 2141.03 describes the level of ordinary skill in the art. Specifying a particular level of skill is not necessary where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level.

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If the only facts of record pertaining to the level of skill in the art are found within the prior art of record, the court has held that an invention may be held to have been obvious without a specific finding of a particular level of skill where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level. *Chore-Time Equipment, Inc. v. Cumberland Corp.*, 713 F.2d 774, 218 USPQ 673 (Fed. Cir. 1983). See also *Okajima v. Bourdeau*, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355, 59 USPQ2d 1795, 1797 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

THE PRIOR ART MUST TEACH OR SUGGEST ALL OF THE LIMITATIONS

16. The Applicant's arguments stating that the combination of the prior art of record does not fully disclose nor fairly suggest the claimed invention fails to persuade the Examiner because, as shown in the rejections below, the prior art of record is clearly and unarguably analogous as well as relevant. In addition, Applicant's arguments regarding the teachings of the prior art of record fall short because when combined together, the prior art of record wholly and flawlessly discloses the claimed invention. Applicant should carefully consider revising the claim language to overcome the pending rejections which may place the application in a better condition for allowance.

17. Therefore, the current examiner maintains the previous rejection of the claimed invention as they have been amended and presented in their current form.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103

18. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 3 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:

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A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.

Subject matter developed by another person, which qualifies as prior art only under subsection (f) or (g) of section 102 of this title, shall not preclude patentability under this section where the subject matter and the claimed invention were, at the time the invention was made, owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person.

19. Claims 1-40 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 3 103 as being unpatentable over Fortenberry et al (WO 99/30256) in view of any of Manasse (WO 97/03423(both cited by applicant), Scroggie et al {6014634} or Jacoves et al (6741968).

20. Regarding claim 1, Fortenberry et al (See abstract, Figs. 1-4, pages 2,3, page 5, lines 1-40 claims 1-15) disclose method for issuing an electronic coupon recorded in a database and subsequently compared with it upon redemption for goods or services substantially as claimed. The differences between the above and the claimed invention is the use of specific terms token and voucher. It is noted that it is believed that coupons are functionally equivalent to a token/voucher. Each of Manasse (see abstract, Figs. 3-5, pages 2-3, page 11, lines 15-20, claims 1-12), Scroggie et al (See abstract, Figs. 1,5, 10-13,15-18) or Jacoves et al (See abstract, Figs. 2,8, 10, 25) show network distributed tokens or vouchers for goods or services. It would have been obvious to the person having ordinary skill in this art to provide a similar arrangement for Fortenberry et al because the coupon incentives are conventional functional equivalents with respect to the claim limitations and electronic network distribution is standard delivery for any digital content. Regarding the network limitations of claim 2, Fortenberry et al (See abstract, Figs.. 1-4, pages 2,3, page 5, lines 1-40 claims 1-15) disclose issuing an electronic coupon recorded in a database over a network and subsequently compared with same upon redemption for goods or services which is a functional equivalent of the claim limitations. Regarding the delivery limitations of claim 3, Fortenberry et al (See abstract, Figs. 1-4, pages 2,3, page 5, lines 1-40 claims 1-15) disclose issuing an electronic coupon recorded in a database over a network and subsequently compared with same upon redemption for goods

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or services which is a functional equivalent of the claim limitations. Regarding the order limitations of claim 4, Manasse (see abstract, Figs. 3-5, pages 2-3, page 11, lines 15-20, claims 1-12), 'Scroggie et al (See abstract, Figs. 1,5, 10-13,15-18) or Jacoves et al (See abstract, Figs. 2,8, 10, 25) show network distributed tokens or vouchers for goods or services including web linked processing, which is a functional equivalent of the claim limitations. Regarding the order limitations of claims 5, Manasse (see 'abstract, Figs. 3-5, pages 2-3, page 11, lines 15-20, claims 1-12), Scroggie et al (See abstract, Figs. 1,5, 10-13,15-18) or Jacoves et al (See abstract, Figs. 2,8, 10, 25) show network distributed tokens or vouchers for goods or services including web linked processing which is a functional equivalent of the claim limitations. Regarding the web limitations of claims 6, Manasse (see abstract, Figs. 3-5, pages 2-3, page 11, lines 15-20, claims 1-12), Scroggie et al (See abstract, Figs. 1,5, 10-13,15-18) or Jacoves et al (See abstract, Figs. 2,8, 10, 25) show network distributed tokens or vouchers for goods or services including web linked processing which is a functional equivalent of the claim limitations. Regarding the web limitations of claims 7, Manasse (see abstract, Figs..3-5, pages 2-3, page 11, lines 15-20, claims 1-12), Scroggie et al (See abstract, Figs. 1,5, 10-13,15-18) or Jacoves et al (See abstract, Figs. 2,8, 10, 25) show network distributed tokens or vouchers for goods or services including web linked processing which is a functional equivalent of the claim limitations. Regarding the web limitations of claim 8, Manasse.(see abstract, Figs. 3-5, pages 2-3, page 11, lines 15-20, claims 1-12), Scroggie et al (See abstract, Figs. 1,5, 10-13,15-18) or Jacoves et al (See abstract, Figs. 2,8, 10, 25) show network distributed tokens or vouchers for goods or services including web linked processing which is a functional equivalent of the claim limitations. Regarding the user limitations of claim 9, Fortenberry et al (See abstract, Figs. 1-4, pages 2,3, page 5, lines 1-40 claims 1-15) disclose issuing an electronic coupon recorded in a database over a network and subsequently compared with same upon redemption for goods or services which is a functional equivalent of the claim limitations. Regarding the network limitations of claim 10, Manasse (see abstract, Figs. 3-5, pages 2-3, page 11, lines 15-20, claims 1-12), Scroggie et al (See abstract, Figs. 1,5, 10-13,15-18) or Jacoves et al (See abstract, Figs. 2,8, 10, 25) show network distributed tokens or vouchers for goods or services including web linked processing which is a functional equivalent of the claim

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limitations. Regarding the beneficiary limitations of claim 11, Manasse (see abstract, Figs. 3-5, pages 2-3, page 11, lines 15-20, claims 1-12), Scroggie et al (See abstract, Figs. 1,5, 10-13,15-18) or Jacoves et al (See abstract, Figs. 2,8, 10, 25).show network distributed tokens or vouchers for goods or services including web linked processing which is a functional equivalent of the claim limitations because manufacturers distribute coupons electronically to a plurality of customers. Regarding the redemption limitations of claims 12-20, Manasse (see abstract, Figs. 3-5, pages 2-3, page 11, lines 15-20, claims 1-12), Scroggie et. al (See abstract, Figs. 1,5, 10-13,15-18) or Jacoves et al (See abstract, Figs. 2,8, 10, 25) show network distributed tokens'or vouchers for goods or services including web linked processing which is a functional equivalent of the claim limitations. Regarding the processing limitations of claims 21-24, Manasse (see abstract, Figs. 3-5, pages 2-3, page 11, lines 15-20, claims 1-12), Scroggie et al (See abstract, Figs. 1,5, 10-13,15-18) or Jacoves et al (See abstract, Figs. 2,8, 10, 25) show network distributed tokens or vouchers for goods or services including web linked processing which is a functional equivalent of the claim limitations because these are no more than the standard processing of coupons. Regarding the image limitations of claims 25-28, Scroggie et al (See abstract, Figs. 1,5, 10-13,15-18) show network distributed tokens or vouchers for goods or services including web linked processing including image(See Fig. 11) which is a functional equivalent of the claim limitations because these are no more than the standard processing of coupons. Regarding the delivery limitations of claims 29-33, Manasse (see abstract, Figs. 3-5, pages 2-3, page 11, lines 15-20, claims 1-12), Scroggie et al (See abstract, Figs. 1,5, 10-13,15-18) or Jacoves et al (See abstract, Figs. 2,8, 10, 25) show network distributed tokens or vouchers for goods or services including web linked processing and email which is a functional equivalent of the claim limitations. Regarding claim 34, Fortenberry et al (See abstract, Figs. 1-4, pages 2,3, page 5, lines 1-40 claims 1-15) disclose a means for issuing an electronic coupon recorded in a database and subsequently compared with it upon redemption for goods or services substantially as claimed. The differences between the above and the claimed invention is the use of specific terms token and voucher. It is noted that it is believed that coupons are functionally equivalent to a token/voucher. Each of Manasse (see abstract, Figs. 3-5, pages 2-3, page 11, lines 15-20, claims 1-12), Scroggie et al (See abstract, Figs. 1,5,' 10-

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13,15-18) or Jacoves et al (See abstract, Figs. 2,8, 10, 25) show network distributed tokens or vouchers for goods or services. It would have been obvious to the person having ordinary skill in this art to provide a similar arrangement for Fortenberry et al because the coupon incentives are conventional functional equivalents with respect to the claim limitations and electronic network distribution is standard delivery for any digital content. Regarding claim 35, Fortenberry et al (See abstract, Figs. 1-4, pages 2,3, page 5., lines 1-40 claims 1-15) disclose a means for issuing an electronic coupon recorded in a database and subsequently compared with it upon redemption for goods or services substantially as claimed. The differences between the above and the claimed invention is the use of specific terms token and voucher. It is noted that it is believed that coupons are functionally equivalent to a token/voucher. Each of Manasse (see abstract, Figs. 3-5, pages 2-3, page 11, lines 15-20, claims 1-12), Scroggie et al (See abstract, Figs. 1,5, 10-13,15-18) or Jacoves et al (See abstract, Figs. 2,8, 10, 25) show network distributed tokens or vouchers for goods or services. It would have been obvious to the person having ordinary skill in this art to provide a similar arrangement for Fortenberry et al because the coupon incentives are conventional functional equivalents with respect to the claim limitations and electronic network distribution is standard delivery for any digital content. Regarding the bank limitations of claims 36-39, Manasse (see abstract, Figs. 3-5, pages 2-3, page 11, lines 15-20, claims 1-12). show network distributed tokens or vouchers for goods or services including web linked processing in an electronic bank equivalent which is a functional equivalent of the claim limitations. Regarding claim 40, Fortenberry et al (See abstract, Figs. 1-4, pages 2,3, page 5, lines 1-40 claims 1-15) disclose a means for issuing an electronic coupon recorded in a database and subsequently compared with it upon redemption for goods or services substantially as claimed. The differences between the above and the claimed invention is the use of specific terms token and voucher. It is noted that it is believed that coupons are functionally equivalent to a token/voucher. Each of Manasse (see abstract, Figs. 3-5, pages 2-3, page 11, lines 15-20, claims 1-12), Scroggie et al (See abstract, Figs. 1,5, 10-13,15-18) or Jacoves et al (See abstract, Figs. 2,8, 10, 25) show network distributed tokens or vouchers for goods or services. It would have been obvious to the person having ordinary skill in this art to provide a similar arrangement for Fortenberry et al because the coupon incentives are conventional functional

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equivalents with respect to the claim limitations and electronic network distribution is standard delivery for any digital content.

21. Examiner's Note: Although Examiner has cited particular columns, line numbers and figures in the references as applied to the claims above for the convenience of the applicant(s), the specified citations are merely representative of the teaching of the prior art that are applied to specific limitations within the individual-claim and other passages and figures may apply as well. It is respectfully requested that the applicant(s), in preparing the response, fully consider the items of evidence in their entirety as potentially teaching all or part of the claimed invention, as well as the context of the passage as taught by the prior art or disclosed by the Examiner.

Conclusion

22. **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL.** See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).

23. A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire **THREE MONTHS** from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within **TWO MONTHS** of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the **THREE-MONTH** shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than **SIX MONTHS** from the mailing date of this final action.

24. Any inquiry of a general nature or relating to the status of this application or concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to **Kambiz Abdi** whose telephone number is **(571) 272-6702**. The Examiner can normally be reached on Monday-Friday, 9:30am-5:00pm. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the Examiner's supervisor, **James Trammell** can be reached at **(571) 272-6712**.

25. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from

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either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see <http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair>.

26. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free).

Any response to this action should be mailed to:

Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Washington, D.C. 20231

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
(571) 273-8300 [Official communications; including After Final communications labeled "Box AF"]

(571) 273-6702 [Informal/Draft communications, labeled "PROPOSED" or "DRAFT"]

Hand delivered responses should be brought to the Examiner in the

Knox Building, 50 Dulany St. Alexandria, VA.

Kambiz Abdi
Primary Examiner
AU 3621



KAMBIZ ABDI
PRIMARY EXAMINER

May 30, 2006